The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle Between Art and Knowledge

By Friedrich Nietzsche—1872

16

[Seen] from the right height everything comes together: the thoughts of the philosopher, the work of the artist, and good deeds.

17

What must be shown is the way in which the entire life of a people reflects in an unclear and confused manner the image offered by their highest geniuses. These geniuses are not the product of the masses, but the masses show their effects.

What is the relationship between the people and the genius otherwise?

There is an invisible bridge from genius to genius which constitutes the genuinely real "history" of a people. Everything else amounts to shadowy, infinite variations in an inferior material, copies made by unskilled hands.

18

How did they philosophize in the splendid world of art? Does philosophizing cease when life achieves perfection? No, true philosophizing begins now for the first time. Its judgment *concerning existence means more*, because it has before it this relative perfection and all the veils of art and illusions.

19

In the world of art and philosophy man cultivates an "immortality of the intellect."

The will alone is immortal; that immortality of the intellect which is achieved through education and which presupposes human brains looks miserable in comparison. One can see the natural lineage to which such immortality belongs.

But how can the genius be the highest goal of nature as well? *Living on by means of history* and living on by means of *procreation*.

This is where Plato's "procreating upon the beautiful" belongs: thus the birth of the genius requires that history be overcome. It must be immersed and eternalized in beauty.

Against *iconic historiography*! It contains within itself a barbarizing element.

History should speak only of what is great and unique, of exemplary models.

With this one lays hold of the task facing the new philosophical generation.

None of the great Greeks of the age of tragedy have anything of the historian about them.

20

The *unselective* knowledge drive resembles the indiscriminate sexual drive—signs of vulgarity!

21

The philosopher does not stand so completely apart from the people as an exception: the will desires something from him too. The intention is the same as in the case of art—the glorification and deliverance of the will itself. From one rung to the next the will strives for *purity and ennoblement.*

22

The drives which distinguish the Greeks from other people are expressed in their philosophy. But these are precisely their *classical* drives.

Their way of dealing with history is significant.

The gradual degeneration in antiquity of the concept of the historian: its dissolution into mere curiosity and the pretense of knowing everything.

23

Task: to recognize the *teleology* of the philosophical genius. Is he really nothing but a wanderer who appears accidentally? In any case, if he is a genuine philosopher he has nothing to do with the accidental political situation of a people; in contrast to his people, he is *timeless*. But this does not mean that his connection with his people is merely accidental. What is unique in a people here comes to light in an individual; the drive of the people is interpreted as a *universal drive* and is employed to solve the riddle of the universe. By *separating* them, nature will one day succeed in contemplating its drives clearly. The philosopher is a means for finding repose in the restless current, for becoming conscious of the enduring types by disdaining multiplicity.

24

The philosopher is a self-revelation of nature's workshop; the philosopher and the artist tell the trade secrets of nature.

The sphere of the philosopher and the artist exists above the tumult of contemporary history, beyond neccesity.

The philosopher as *brakeshoe on the wheel of time*.

Philosophers appear during those times of great danger, when the wheel of time is turning faster and faster. Together with art, they step into the place vacated by myth. But they are far ahead of their time, since the attention of their contemporaries only turns toward them very slowly.

A people which is becoming conscious of its dangers produces a genius.

25

After Socrates it is no longer possible to preserve the commonweal: hence that individualizing ethics which seeks to preserve the individual.

The unmeasured and indiscriminate knowledge drive is, along with its historical background, a sign that life has grown old. There is great danger that individuals are becoming inferior; therefore, their interests are powerfully captivated by objects of knowledge, no matter which. The universal drives have become so feeble that they are no longer able to hold the individual in check.

The Teuton used the sciences to transfigure all of his limitations at the same time that he transmitted them: fidelity, modesty, self-restraint, diligence, cleanliness, love of order—the familial virtues. But also formlessness, the complete lack of any vivacity in life, and pettiness. His unlimited knowledge drive is the consequence of an impoverished life. Without this drive he would be petty and

spiteful—which he often is despite it.

Today we are presented with a higher form of life, against a background of art: and now likewise, the immediate consequence is [the development of] a selective knowledge drive, i.e. *philosophy*.

Terrible danger: the fusion of the American kind of political agitation with the rootless culture of the scholars.

26

With the selective knowledge drive *beauty* again emerges as power. It is most remarkable that Schopenhauer *writes well*! His life too has more style than that of a university teacher—but he had a stunted environment.

No one today knows what a good book looks like; one must show them. They do not understand composition; more and more the press is ruining the feeling for it.

Oh, to be able to hold fast to the sublime!

27

Enormous *artistic* powers are required in opposition to iconic historiography and natural science.

What should the philosopher do? In the midst of this ant-like swarming he must emphasize the problem of existence, all the eternal problems.

The philosopher should *recognize what is needed*, and the artist should *create* it. The philosopher should empathize to the utmost with the universal suffering,just as each of the ancient Greek philosophers expresses a need and erects his system in the vacant space indicated by that need. Within this space he constructs his world.

28

The difference between the effect of philosophy and that of science must be made clear, and likewise, their different origins.

It is not a question of annihilating science, but of controlling it. Science is totally dependent upon philosophical opinions for all of its goals and methods, though it easily forgets this. *But that philosophy which gains control also has to consider the problem of the level to which science should be permitted to develop: it has to determine value*.

29

Proof of the *barbarizing* effects of science: it easily looses itself in the service of "practical interests."

Schopenhauer is valuable, because he calls to mind the memory of *naive, universal* truths . He dares to articulate beautifully so-called "trivialities."

We have no noble popular philosophy, because we have no noble concept of *peuple* (*publicum*). Our popular philosophy is for the peuple, not for the public.

30

If we are ever to achieve a culture, unheard-of artistic powers will be needed in order to break the unlimited knowledge drive, in order to produce unity once again. *Philosophy reveals its highest worth when it concentrates the unlimited knowledge drive and subdues it to unity*.

31

This is the way in which the earlier Greek philosophers are to be understood: they master the knowledge drive. How did it happen that they gradually lost this mastery after Socrates? To begin with *Socrates and his school* showed the same tendency: the knowledge drive should be restrained out of *individual* concern for *living happily* . This is a final, inferior phase. Previously, it was not a question of *individuals*, but of the *Hellenes*.

32

The great ancient philosophers are part of *general Hellenic life; after Socrates* philosophers formed *sects*. Gradually philosophy let the reins of science drop from its hands.

In the middle ages these reins were picked up by theology. Now is the dangerous age of emancipation.

The general welfare again desires a mastery and thereby at the same time elevation and concentration.

The *"laisser aller" of our science* resembles certain *dogmas of political economy*: one has faith in an absolutely beneficial result.

In a certain sense, *Kant's* influence was detrimental, because belief in metaphysics has been lost. No one would rely upon his "thing in itself' as if it were a principle which could master anything.

We can now comprehend what is remarkable about Schopenhauer: He assembles all the elements which are still of use for controlling science; he hits upon the most profound and primal problems of ethics and of art; he poses the question concerning the value of existence.

The marvelous unity of Wagner and Schopenhauer! They originate from the same drive. The deepest qualities of the Germanic spirit here prepare themselves for battle—as in the case of the Greeks.

Return of *circumspection*.

33

My task: to comprehend *the internal coherence and necessity of every true culture*; to comprehend a culture's preservatives and restoratives and their relationship to the genius of the people. A culture is the consequence of every great art world, but it often happens that—due to hostile countercurrents—this final resonance of a work of art remains unachieved.

34

Philosophy should hold fast to that *spiritual mountain range* which stretches across the centuries, and therewith, to the eternal fruitfulness of everything that is great.

For science there is nothing great and nothing small—but for philosophy! The value of science is measured in that sentence.

Holding fast to that which is sublime!

What an extraordinary *deficiency* there is in our age of books which breathe an heroic strength. Even Plutarch is no longer read!

35

Kant said (in the second Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*): "*I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith*. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the preconception that it is possible to make headway in metaphysics without a previous criticism of reason, is the source of all that unbelief, always very dogmatic, which wars against morality." Very significant! Kant was impelled by a cultural need!

What a curious opposition, "*knowledge and faith*"! What would the Greeks have thought of this? Kant *was acquainted with no other opposition, but what about us*!

A cultural need impels Kant; he wishes to *preserve* a domain *from knowledge*: that is where the roots of all that is highest and deepest lie, of art and of ethics—Schopenhauer.

On the other side he assembles everything which *has ever been worth knowing*—ethical, popular, and human wisdom (standpoint of the seven wise men, of the Greek popular philosophers).

He breaks this faith up into its elements and shows the insufficiency of the Christian faith for our deepest needs: question concerning the value of existence.

36

The struggle between knowledge and knowledge.

Schopenhauer calls attention to even that thinking and knowing of which we are *unconscious*.

The mastery of the knowledge drive: Does it work to the advantage of a religion? Or to the advantage of an artistic culture? The answer should now become evident; I favor the latter alternative.

To this I add the question concerning the *value* of historical, *iconic* knowing, as well as of *nature*.

In the case of the Greeks this mastery works to the advantage of an artistic culture (and religion?), the mastery which is intended to *prevent* a state of total release. We desire to regain mastery over that which has been totally released.

37

The philosopher of tragic knowledge. He masters the uncontrolled knowledge drive, though not by means of a new metaphysics. He establishes no new faith. He considers it *tragic* that the ground of metaphysics has been withdrawn, and he will never permit himself to be satisfied with the motley whirling game of the sciences. He cultivates a new *life*; he returns to art its rights.

The philosopher of *desperate knowledge* will be absorbed in blind science: knowledge at any price.

For the tragic philosopher the appearance of the metaphysical as merely anthropomorphic completes the *picture of existence*. He is not a *skeptic*.

Here there is a concept which must be *created*, for skepticism is not the goal. When carried to its limits the knowledge drive turns against itself in order to proceed to the *critique of knowing*. Knowledge in the service of the best life. One must even *will illusion*—that is what is tragic.

38

The last philosopher—this could be entire generations. He only has to assist *life*. Naturally, he is "the last" in a relative sense, "the last" for our world. He demonstrates the necessity of illusions, of art, and of that art which rules over life. It is not possible for us to produce again a series of philosophers like that of Greece during the age of tragedy. Their task is now accomplished by *art alone*. Such a system remains possible only as *art*. Judged from the standpoint of the present, an entire period of

Greek philosophy simultaneously belongs within the realm of their art.

39

The mastery of science occurs now *only* by means of *art*. It is a question of *value judgments* concerning knowledge and polymathy. How enormous is the task, and how worthy of it art is! It must create everything anew and, *all by itself, it must give birth anew to life*. The Greeks show us what art is capable of. If we did not have them, our faith would be chimerical.

Whether or not a religion is able to establish itself here within this vacuum depends upon its strength. *We* are committed to *culture*: the "German" as a *redeeming* force! In any case, that religion which would be able so to establish itself would have to possess an immense *power of love*—against which knowledge would shatter as it does against the language of art.

But might not art itself perhaps be capable of creating a religion, of giving birth to myth? This was the case among the Greeks.

40

Philosophies and theologies which have now been *demolished* still continue to operate in science. Even when the roots have died, the branches still live for a while. The *sense of history* has been widely developed, especially as a counter-force against theological myth, but also against philosophy. In history and in mathematical natural science *absolute knowing* celebrates its Saturnalia. The smallest matter that can actually be decided in these realms is worth more than all the ideas of metaphysics. Value is here determined by the degree of *certainty*, not the degree of *indispensability* for men. It is the old struggle between *faith and knowledge*.

41

These are barbarian biases.

All that philosophy can do now is to emphasize the *relativity* and *anthropomorphic* character of all knowledge, as well as the all pervasive ruling power of *illusion*. By doing this philosophy is no longer able to check the uncontrolled knowledge drive, which *judges* more and more according to the degree of certainty and which seeks smaller and smaller objects. Whereas every man is glad when a day is over, the historian seeks to unearth and to reconstruct this day in order to save it from oblivion. Thus, what is *small* shall be eternal, *because it is knowable*.

The only criterion which counts for us is the aesthetic criterion. What is *great* has a right to history, but not a history of the iconic sort; rather, it merits a *productive and stimulating canvas of historical events*. We leave the *graves undisturbed*; we take possession of what is eternally alive.

Pet topic of the present age: *the great effects of the smallest thing*. For example, historical grubbing, when taken as a whole contains an element of grandeur. It is similar to that stunted vegetation which gradually reduces the Alps to dust. We see a great drive which employs a *grand number* of small instruments.

42

On the other hand, one could mention: *the small effects of what is great*, where greatness is represented by individuals. What is great is difficult to grasp; the tradition often dies away; hatred against it is universal; its value depends upon its quality, which always has few admirers.

Great things only have an effect upon great things, just as the signal flares in *Agamemnon* leap

only from summit to summit.

The task of *culture* is to see to it that what is great in a people does not appear among them as a hermit or exile.

This is the reason why we wish to relate what we perceive. It is not our business to wait until the valleys have been penetrated by the feeble reflection of what is already clear to me—namely, that in the final analysis the great effects of the smallest things are only aftereffects of *great things*. They have started an avalanche; now we are having trouble stopping it.

43

History and the natural sciences were necessary to combat the middle ages: knowledge versus faith. We now oppose knowledge with *art*: return to life! Mastery of the knowledge drive! Strengthening of the moral and aesthetic instincts!

This seems to us to constitute the *salvation of the German spirit, so that that spirit might once again be a savior*.

For us the essence of this spirit has been absorbed into *music*. Now we understand the way in which the *Greeks* made their culture dependent upon music.

44

In order to create a religion one would have to *awaken belief* in a mythical construction which one had erected in the vacuum—which would mean that this construction corresponds to an extraordinary need. It is *unlikely* that this will ever happen again after the *Critique of Pure Reason*. On the other hand, I can imagine a totally new type of *philosopher-artist* who fills the empty space with a *work of art*, possessing aesthetic value.

How *creatively* the Greeks dealt with their gods!

We are all too familiar with the opposition between historical truth and untruth. It is strange that the Christian myths are said to be thoroughly *historical*!

45

Pity and being good are fortunately independent of the decay or the growth of any religion; good *deeds*, on the other hand are determined to a very large extent by religious imperative. By far the largest percentage of good, dutiful acts have no ethical value, rather, they have been performed under *compulsion*.

Practical morality will suffer greatly from every breakdown of religion. The metaphysics of punishment and reward seems to be indispensable.

If one could create *customs*—strong *customs*—one would thereby have ethics as well.

Customs, but customs which have been fashioned on the *example of powerful individual personalities*.

I do not expect an awakening of *goodness* among any substantial portion of the propertied classes, but one might be able to instill in them a *custom*, a duty toward tradition.

If mankind spent for education and schools what it has spent until now for the construction of churches! If it now directed the intelligence to education that it does to theolog!

46

The problem of *culture* is seldom grasped correctly. The goal of a culture is not the greatest

possible *happiness* of a people, nor is it the unhindered development of *all* their talents; instead, culture shows itself in the correct *proportion* of these developments. Its aim points beyond earthly happiness: the production of great works is the aim of culture.

In all the drives of the Greeks there is manifested a *mastering unity*—let us call it the "Hellenic *will*." Each of these drives by itself endeavors to exist to eternity. The ancient philosophers attempt to construct a world from these drives.

The *culture* of a people is manifest in the *unifying mastery of their drives*: philosophy masters the knowledge drive; art masters ecstasy and the formal drive; ἀγάπη masters ἔρως, etc.

Knowledge *isolates*. The early philosophers represented in isolation things which Greek art allowed to appear together.

The contents are the same in art and in ancient philosophy, but in philosophy we observe the *isolated* elements of art employed in order to *master the knowledge drive*. This must also be demonstrable in the case of the Italians: individualism in life and art.

47

The Greeks as discoverers, voyagers, and colonizers. They knew how to *learn*: an immense power of appropriation. Our age should not think that it stands so much higher in terms of its knowledge drive—except that in the case of the Greeks everything was *life*! With us it remains knowledge!

When one considers, on the other hand, the *value* of knowledge, and, on the other hand, a beautiful illusion which has exactly the same value as an item of knowledge—provided only that it is an illusion in which one believes—, then one realizes that life requires illusions, i.e. untruths which are taken to be truths. What life does require is belief in truth, but illusion is sufficient for this. That is to say, "truths" do not establish themselves by means of logical proofs, but by means of their effects: proofs of strength. The true and the effective are taken to be identical; here too one submits to force. How then is one to explain the fact that any logical demonstration of truth occurred at all? In the *struggle between "truth"* and *"truth"* both sides seek an alliance with reflection. *All actual striving for truth has come into the world through the struggle for a holy conviction*—through the πάθος of the struggle. Otherwise men have no interest in the logical origin.

48

How does the philosophical genius relate to art? There is not much to be learned from his direct conduct. We must ask: "What is there of art in his philosophy? [In what respect is it] a work of art? What *remains* when his system has been destroyed as science?" But this left over element must be precisely the one which *masters* the knowledge drive; therefore, it must be the artistic element in his philosophical system. Why is such a mastery necessary? For, considered scientifically, a philosophical system is an illusion, an untruth which deceives the drive to knowledge and satisfies it only temporarily. In such satisfaction, the value of philosophy does not lie in the sphere of knowledge, but in that of life. The *will to existence employs philosophy* for the purposes of a higher form of existence.

It is impossible for art and philosophy to *oppose* the will. Morality likewise is in its service. Omnipotence of the *will*. One of the most delicate forms of existence, relative nirvana.

49

The beauty and grandeur of an interpretation of the world (*alias* philosophy) is what is now decisive for its value, i.e. it is judged as *art*. Its form will probably change: The rigid mathematical

formula (as in Spinoza) which had such a soothing influence on Goethe now remains justified only as an aesthetic means of expression.

50

This proposition must be established: We live only by means of illusions; our consciousness skims over the surface. Much is hidden from our view. Moreover, there is no danger that man will ever understand himself *completely*, that he will penetrate at every instant all the laws of leverage and mechanics and all the formulas of architecture and chemistry which his life requires. However, it is quite possible that the *schema* of everything might become known. That will change almost nothing regarding our lives. Besides, this is all nothing but formulas for absolutely unknowable forces.

51

Owing to the superficiality of our intellect we indeed live in an ongoing illusion, i.e. at every instant we need art in order to live. Our eyes detain us at the *forms* . But if we have gradually acquired such eyes for ourselves, then there is an *artistic power* which holds sway within us. Thus in nature itself we see mechanisms opposed to absolute *knowledge*: the philosopher *recognizes* the language of nature and says "we need art" and "we require only a portion of knowledge."

52

Every kind of *culture* begins by *veiling* a great number of things. Human progress depends upon this veiling: life in a pure and noble sphere separated from the more common attractions. The struggle against "sensuality" by means of virtue is an essentially aesthetic struggle. When we employ as our guiding stars *great* individuals, we veil over many things about them; indeed, we disguise all the circumstances and accidents which make possible their formation. In order that we may venerate them, we *isolate* them from themselves. Every religion contains such an element: the men who are under divine protection are considered infinitely important. Indeed, all ethics begins when the individual is taken to be of *infinite importance*—in contrast to nature, which behaves cruelly and playfully toward the individual. If we are better and more noble, it is because we have been made this way by those illusions which isolate us.

Natural science opposes this with the absolute truth of nature: advanced physiology will certainly comprehend the artistic powers already present in our development—and not only in human development, but also in that of the animals. Advanced physiology will declare that the *artistic* begins with the *organic*.

Perhaps the chemical transformations in inorganic nature should also be called artistic processes, mimic roles adopted by a particular force. But there are *several* roles which it can play!

53

Great dilemma: is philosophy an art or a science? Both in its purposes and its results it is an art. But it uses the same means as science—conceptual representation. Philosophy is a form of artistic invention. There is no appropriate category for philosophy; consequently, we must make up and characterize a species [for it].

The natural history of the philosopher. He knows in that he invents, and he invents in that he knows.

He does not grow: I mean, philosophy does not follow the course of the other sciences, even if certain of the philosopher's territories gradually fall into the hands of science. Heraclitus can never be

obsolete. Philosophy is invention beyond the limits of experience; it is the continuation of the *mythical drive*. It is thus essentially pictorial. Mathematical expression is not a part of the essence of philosophy.

Overcoming of knowledge by means of the powers that *fashion myths*. Kant is remarkable—knowledge and faith! Innermost kinship between *philosophers and founders of religion*.

Curious problem: the self-consumption of philosophical systems! This is equally unheard of in science and in art. Religion, however, is *similar* to philosophy in this respect: this is remarkable and significant.

54

Our understanding is a surface power; it is *superficial*. One also calls it "subjective." It understands things by means of *concepts* ; i.e. our thinking is a process of categorizing and naming. Thus thinking is something dependent upon human option and does not touch the thing itself. Man possesses absolute knowledge only while calculating and only in the forms of space; i.e. *quantities* are the ultimate boundaries of what is knowable. Man does not *understand* a single quality, but only quantity.

What can be the purpose of such a surface power?

To the concept there corresponds, in the first place, the image. Images are primitive thoughts, i.e. the surfaces of things combined in the mirror of the eye.

The *image* is one thing; the *calculation* is another.

Images in the human eye! This governs all human nature: from the *eye* out! Subject! The *ear* hears sound; an entirely different and marvelous conception of the same world.

Art depends upon the *inexactitude* of *sight.*

Similarly in the case of the ear: art depends upon a similar inaccuracy regarding rhythm, temperament, etc.

55

There exists within us a power which permits the *major* features of the mirror image to be perceived with greater intensity, and again there is a power which emphasizes rhythmic similarity beyond the actual inexactitude. This must be an *artistic power*, because it is *creative*. Its chief creative means are *omitting*, *overlooking*, and *ignoring*. It is therefore an anti-scientific power, because it does not have the same degree of interest in everything that is perceived.

The word contains nothing but an image; from this comes the concept. Thinking thus calculates with artistic magnitudes.

All categorization is an attempt to arrive at images.

We relate superficially to every true *being*; we speak the language of symbol and image. Then, we artistically add something to this by reinforcing the main features and forgetting the secondary ones.

56

Art's apology. Our public, civic, and social life amounts to an equilibrium of self interests. It answers the question of how to achieve a mediocre existence lacking any power of love, merely as a result of the prudence of the self interests involved.

Our age hates art, as it does religion. It desires no reconciliation, neither by means of an allusion to the beyond, nor by means of an allusion to the transfiguration of the world of art. It considers this to be useless "poesy," amusement, etc. Our "poets" *conform* to this desire. But art as terrible seriousness! The new metaphysics as terrible seriousness! We want to so rearrange the world for you with images

that you will shudder. And it is within our power to do this! Even if you stop up your ears, your eyes will see our myths. Our curses will fall upon you.

Science must now demonstrate its utility! It has become a source of nourishment for egoism. The state and society have drafted a science into their service in order to exploit it for *their* purposes.

The normal condition is that of *war*: we conclude *peace* only for specific periods of time.

57

I have to know how the Greeks philosophized in the age of their art. The *Socratic* schools sat in the middle of a sea of beauty: what does one see of this in their work? An immense expenditure is made in behalf of art, towards which the Socratics have either a hostile or a theoretical attitude.

The earlier philosophers, on the other hand, are governed in part by a drive similar to the one which created tragedy.

58

The concept of the philosopher and the types [of philosophers]. What do they all have in common?

The philosopher is either the product of his culture or else he is hostile towards it.

He is contemplative like the plastic artist, compassionate like the religious man, and, like the man of science, is concerned with causes. He tries to permit all the sounds of the world to resonate within himself and to present this total sound outside of himself by means of concepts: expanding himself to the macrocosm while, at the same time, maintaining reflective circumspection—like the actor or dramatic poet who transforms himself and at the same time retains his circumspection so that he can project himself outwards. Dialectical thinking is like a shower pouring over all of this.

Plato is remarkable: an enthusiast of dialectic, i.e. of such circumspection.

59

The philosophers. Natural history of the philosopher. The philosopher alongside the man of science and the artist.

Mastery of the knowledge drive by means of art; mastery of the religious drive for unity by means of the concept.

The juxtaposition of conception and abstraction is curious.

The meaning for culture.

Metaphysics as a vacuum.

The philosopher of the future? He must become the supreme tribunal of an artistic culture, the police force, as it were, against all transgressions.

60

Philosophical thinking can be detected in the midst of all scientific thinking, even in the case of conjectures.

It leaps ahead on nimble legs, while the understanding ponderously wheezes along behind and seeks sturdier legs when the tempting magical image has appeared to it. An infinitely rapid flight through immense spaces! Is philosophical thinking only distinguished by its greater rapidity? No. It is the wingbeat of imagination, i.e. a repeated leaping from possibility to possibility—possibilities which, for the time being, are accepted as certainties. Here and there, from a possibility to a certainty and then back to a possibility.

But what is a "possibility" of this sort? A sudden notion, e.g.: "it might perhaps be possible." But how do such notions *occur*? Occasionally by external accident: a comparison takes place, the discovery of some sort of analogy. A process of *expansion* and *amplification* now begins. Imagination consists in the *quick observation of similarities*. Afterwards, reflection measures one concept by another and performs tests. *Similarity* will be replaced by *causality*.

Now then, is "scientific" thinking distinguished from "philosophical" thinking merely by the *dosage*, or perhaps by the *domain*?

61

There is no distinct philosophy separated from science: there they think in the same manner that we do here. The reason why *indemonstrable* philosophizing retains some value, and for the most part a higher value than a scientific proposition, lies in the *aesthetic* value of such philosophizing, in its beauty and sublimity. Even when it cannot prove itself as a scientific construction, it continues to exist as a *work of art*. But isn't it the same in the case of scientific matters? In other words, the *aesthetic* consideration is decisive, not the pure *knowledge drive* . The poorly demonstrated philosophy of Heraclitus possesses far more artistic value than do all the propositions of Aristotle.

Therefore, in the culture of a people, the knowledge drive is mastered by the imagination. This fills the philosopher with the highest *pathos of truth*: the value of his knowledge vouches to him for its *truth* . All *fruitfulness* and all driving force are derived from these *prescient* glimpses.

62

Imaginative production may be observed in the eye. Similarity leads to the boldest further development. But so do entirely different relationships: contrasts lead unceasingly to contrasts. Here one can *see* the extraordinary productivity of the intellect. It is a life in images.

63

In order to think, one must already possess in imagination that which one seeks, for only then can reflection judge it. Reflection accomplishes this by measuring that which is to be judged against customary and time-tested standards.

What is really "logical" about picture-thinking.

The sober man seldom uses and seldom *possesses* imagination.

In any case, this production of forms, by means of which the memory of something occurs, is something artistic. *It throws this form into relief* and strengthens it thereby. Thinking is a process of throwing into relief.

There are many more sets of images in the brain than are consumed in thinking. The intellect rapidly selects similar images; the image chosen gives rise, in turn, to a profusion of images; but again, the intellect quickly selects one among them, etc.

Conscious thinking is nothing but a process of selecting representations. It is a long way from this to abstraction.

(1) the power which produces the profusion of images; (2) the power which selects and emphasizes what is similar.

Feverish persons deal in the same way with walls and tapestries; the difference is that healthy persons project the tapestry as well.

64

There is a twofold artistic power here: that which produces images and that which chooses among them.

The correctness of this is proved by the dream world: in this world one does not proceed to abstraction, or: one is not guided and modified in this world by the images which pour in through the eyes.

When one considers this power more closely, it is obvious that here too there is no totally free artistic inventing—for that would be something arbitrary and hence impossible. Instead, these images are the finest emanations of nervous activity as it is viewed on a surface. The images are related to the underlying nervous activity which agitates them in the same way that Chladni's acoustical figures are to the sound itself. The most delicate oscillation and vibration! Considered physiologically, the artistic process is absolutely determined and necessary. On the surface all thinking appears to us to be voluntary and within our control. We do not notice the infinite activity.

It is blatantly anthropopathic to imagine an *artistic process apart from a brain*: but the case is the same with "willing," "morality," etc.

Desire is therefore nothing but a physiological epi-activity which wants to discharge itself and which exerts pressure upon the brain.

65

Result: it is only a question of *degrees* and *quantities*. All men are artistic, philosophical, scientific, etc.

Our esteem depends upon quantities, not qualities. We admire what is *great*, which is, of course, also what is *not normal*.

For admiration for the grand effects of what is small is nothing but astonishment at the results and at the incongruity of the smallest cause. We have the impression of greatness only when we add together a great many effects and view them as a *unity* ; i.e. by means of this unity *we produce* greatness.

But humanity grows only through admiration for what is *rare* and *great*. Even something which is merely imagined to be rare and great—a miracle, for example—has this effect. Fright is the best part of mankind.

Dreaming as the selective continuation of visual images.

In the realm of the intellect everything qualitative is merely *quantitative*. What leads us to qualities is the concept, the word.

66

Perhaps man i s able to *forget* nothing. The operations of seeing and perceiving are much too complicated for it to be possible for them to be entirely effaced; i.e. all the forms which the brain and the nervous system have once produced are often repeated in the same way from then on. The same nervous activity produces the same image again.

67

The most delicate sensations of pleasure and displeasure constitute the genuine raw material for all perceiving. The real mystery concerns that surface upon which forms are sketched by the activity of the nerves in pleasure and pain: sensation immediately projects *forms*, which in turn produce new sensations.

It is the nature of sensations of pleasure and displeasure to express themselves through adequate motions. The sensing of the *image* arises from the fact that these appropriate motions in turn bring about sensations in other nerves.

Darwinism applies also to picture-thinking: the stronger image consumes the weaker one.

Whether thinking proceeds with pleasure or with displeasure is an essential distinction: the person who finds thinking to be genuinely difficult is certainly less likely to apply himself to it and will also probably not get as far. He *forces* himself, which is useless in this realm.

68

A result which has been obtained by leaps is sometimes immediately proved to be true and fruitful when considered from the standpoint of its consequences.

Is a scientific inquirer of genius guided by correct *presentiment*? Yes, what he sees are precisely *possibilities* which lack sufficient support. That he considers something like that to be possible betrays his genius. He rapidly passes over what he is more or less able to prove.

The misuse of knowledge: in the endless repetition of experiments and gathering of material, when the conclusion can be quickly established on the basis of a few instances. This even occurs in philology: in many cases the completeness of the materials is superfluous.

69

Even that which is moral has the intellect as its sole source, but the effect of the binding chain of images is different in this case than in the cases of the artist and the thinker. Here it provokes an *act*. The sensing and identification of similar things is certainly a necessary prerequisite, followed by the recollection of one's own pain. Thus, "to be good" might mean "to identify *very easily* and *quickly*." There is a transformation here similar to that of an actor.

On the other hand, all righteousness and justice are derived from an *equilibrium of self-interests*: from reciprocal agreement not to harm each other; thus, from prudence. It appears differently, of course, in the form of fixed principles, as *firmness* of character. The opposition of love and justice, culminating in sacrifice for the sake of the world.

The action of the just man is determined by anticipation of possible feelings of displeasure: he knows empirically the consequences of injuring his neighbor—but also of injuring himself. The Christian ethic is the opposite of this: it is based upon identifying oneself with one's neighbor. Doing good unto another is here a good deed toward oneself; suffering with others is here the same as one's own suffering. Love is bound up with a desire for unity.

70

Man demands truth and fulfills this demand in moral intercourse with other men; this is the basis of all social life. One anticipates the unpleasant consequences of reciprocal lying. From this there arises the *duty of truth*. We permit epic poets to *lie* because we expect no detrimental consequences in this case. Thus the lie is permitted where it is considered something pleasant. Assuming that it does no harm, the lie is beautiful and charming. Thus the priest invents myths for his gods which justify their sublimity. It is extraordinarily difficult to revive the mythical feeling of the free lie. Yet the great Greek philosophers dwell entirely within this justification of the lie.

Where one can know nothing that is true, there the lie is permitted.

Every man allows himself to be continually deceived in his dreams at night.

Mankind acquires the aspiration for truth with infinite slowness. Our feeling for history is something quite new in the world. It might be possible for this historical feeling to suppress art completely.

The utterance of the *truth at any price* is something *Socratic*.

71

Truth and lie physiologically considered.

Truth as moral commandment—the two sources of morality.

The essence of truth as judged according to its *effects*.

These effects tempt us to posit unproven "truths."

In the *struggle* between such truths which live by means of force the need to discover some other way becomes evident: either using it [i.e. the "truth"] to explain everything, or else arriving at it from examples and appearances.

The marvelous invention of logic.

Gradual predominance of the forces of logic and limitation of the field of *possible* knowledge.

Incessant reaction of the forces of art and limitation to the field of what is *worth* knowing (judged according to its *effect*).

72

The philosopher's inner struggle. His universal drive pushes him in the direction of poor thinking; the immense pathos of truth which is produced by his breadth of vision pushes him toward *communication* and this, in turn, toward logic.

On the one side there grows up an *optimistic metaphysics of logic*, which gradually contaminates everything and covers it with lies. When logic is thought to be the sole ruler it leads to lies; for it *is* not the sole ruler.

The other sort of feeling for truth is one that grows out of *love*: proof of strength.

Uttering *blissful* truth out of *love*: this is based upon the kind of knowledge which the individual is not obliged to communicate, but which he is forced to communicate by an overflowing bliss.

73

Man's longing to be completely truthful in the midst of a mendacious natural order is something noble and heroic. But this is *possible* only in a *very relative sense*. That is tragic. That is *Kant's tragic problem*! Art now acquires an entirely new dignity. The sciences, in contrast, are *degraded* to a degree.

The truthfulness of art: it alone is now honest. Thus, after an immense detour, we again return to the *natural* condition (that of the Greeks) . It has proven to be impossible to build a culture upon knowledge.

74

The great ethical strength of the Stoics may be seen in the fact that they violated their own principle on behalf of the freedom of the will.

On moral theory: In politics the statesman frequently anticipates his opponent's act and does it before him: "If I don't do it, he will." A sort of *self-defense* as the fundamental principle of politics. The standpoint of war.

75

The ancient Greeks lack a normative theology: everyone has the right to invent and to believe whatever he likes about it.

The enormous *quantity* of philosophical thinking among the Greeks (together with its continuation through the centuries as theology).

Their great powers of logic are revealed for instance in the organization of cults in the individual cities.

The Orphic phantasma are *stiff and poorly formed*, bordering on allegory.

The Stoic gods concern themselves only with what is great, neglecting what is small and individual.

76

Schopenhauer denies the moral efficacy of moral philosophy, just as artists do not create according to concepts. Interesting! It is true that every man is already an intelligible being (determined through countless generations!), but these moral powers are *strengthened* by the more intense excitation of certain sensations by means of concepts. Such excitation creates nothing new, but it concentrates the creative energies on one side . For example, the categorical imperative has greatly strengthened the unselfish feeling of virtue.

Here likewise we see that the individual man of moral eminence casts an imitative spell. The philosopher is supposed to spread this spell. What is a law for the highest specimens must gradually be accepted as law as such, even if only as a *barrier* to the others.

77

The lawsuit of all religion, philosophy, and science vs. the world: it begins with the grossest anthropomorphisms and *unceasingly becomes more refined*.

The individual person considers even the celestial system to be serving him or in connection with him.

In their mythology the Greeks transformed all of nature into their own image. It was as if they regarded nature merely as a masquerade and a disguise for anthropomorphic gods. In this they showed themselves to be the opposite of all realists. There was within them a profound opposition between truth and appearance. Their metamorphoses are what distinguishes them.

78

Does intuition refer to the concept of the species or to the perfected types? But the concept of the species always falls far short of a good specimen, and the perfect type surpasses actuality.

Ethical anthropomorphisms.	Anaximander: justice. Heraclitus: law. Empedocles: love and hate.
Logical anthropomorphisms.	Parmenides : nothing but being Anaxagoras: νους. Pythagoras: everything is number.

79

The briefest version of world history is the one which is apportioned according to significant

contributions to philosophical knowledge, omitting those periods which were hostile to philosophy. Among the *Greeks* we observe a sensitivity and creative power to be found nowhere else. They occupy the greatest space of time: they really produced all the types.

They are the inventors of *logic*.

Hasn't language already disclosed man's capacity for producing logic? It certainly includes the most admirable logical operations and distinctions. But language did not develop all at once; it is instead the logical conclusion of endlessly long spaces of time. Here the origination of the instincts must be considered: they have developed quite gradually.

The spiritual activity of millenia is deposited in language.

80

Only very slowly does man discover how infinitely complicated the world is. At first he consider it to be something quite simple, i.e. something as superficial as he himself is.

He starts from himself, from the most recent result of nature, and imagines that the forces—the primal forces—are similar to what enters his consciousness. He accepts the *operations of the most complicated mechanism*, the brain, as similar to the very earliest modes of operation. Since this complicated mechanism is able to produce something intelligible in a short time, he assumes that the existence of the world is very recent. He thinks that it cannot have taken the creator so very much time.

Thus he believes that something has been explained by the word "instinct," and indeed, he assigns an unconscious purposive activity to the original genesis of things.

Space, time, and the feeling of causality appear to have been given along with the first *sensation*.

Man is acquainted with the world to the extent that he is acquainted with himself; i.e. its depth is revealed to him to the extent that he is astonished by himself and his own complexity.

81

It is just as rational to take man's moral, artistic, and religious wants as the basis of the world as it is to take as its basis his mechanical wants: we are acquainted with neither impact nor gravity. (?)

82

We do not know the true nature of *a single causality*. Absolute skepticism: the necessity of art and illusion. Perhaps gravity is to be explained by the movement of the aether, which—along with the entire solar system—revolves around some immense heavenly body.

83

Neither the metaphysical, nor the ethical, nor the aesthetic meaning of existence can be *proven*.

The orderliness of the world—the most laboriously and slowly achieved result of terrible evolutions—grasped as the essence of the world: Heraclitus!

84

It has to be *proven* that all constructions of the world are anthropomorphic, indeed, if Kant is right, all sciences. There is, to be sure, a vicious circle here: if the sciences are right, then we are not supported by Kant's foundation; if Kant is right, then the sciences are wrong.

Against Kant, it must always be further objected that, even if we grant all of his propositions, it still remains entirely *possible* that the world is as it appears to us to be. Furthermore, this entire position

is useless from a personal point of view; no one can live in this skepticism.

We must get beyond this skepticism; we must *forget* it! How many things do we not have to forget in this world! (Art, ideal shape, temperament.)

Our salvation lies not in *knowing*, but in *creating*! Our greatness lies in the highest illusions, in the noblest emotion. If the universe is of no concern to us, then we ought to have the right to despise it.

85

The terrible loneliness of the last philosopher! Nature towers rigidly around him; vultures hover above him. And so he cries out to nature, "Grant me forgetfulness! Forgetfulness!" *No, he endures suffering like a Titan until he is offered reconciliation in the highest tragic art*.

86

To consider the "spirit," which is a product of the brain, to be something supernatural! Even to deify it! What madness!

Among millions of decaying worlds, there is once in a while an acceptable one! It too decays! It was not the first!

87

Oedipus
Soliloquy of the Last Philosopher
(A fragment from the history of posterity)

"I call myself the last philosopher, because I am the last man. No one speaks with me but myself, and my voice comes to me like the voice of a dying man! Let me associate for but one hour more with you, dear voice, with you, the last trace of the memory of all human happiness. With you I escape loneliness through self-delusion and lie myself into multiplicity and love. For my heart resists the belief that love is dead. It cannot bear the shudder of the loneliest loneliness, and so it forces me to speak as if I were two persons.

"Do I still hear you, my voice? Are you whispering as you curse? And yet your curses should cause the bowels of this earth to burst open! But the world continues to live and only stares at me even more glitteringly and coldly with its pitiless stars. It continues to live as dumbly and blindly as ever, and only *one thing* dies—man.

"And yet, I still hear you, dear voice! *Something* else dies, something other than me, the last man in this universe. The last sigh, *your* sigh, dies with me. The drawn-out 'alas! alas!' sighed for me, Oedipus, the last miserable man."

88

We see in contemporary Germany that the blossom of science is possible in a barbarized culture; likewise, we see that utility has nothing to do with science (though it might seem that it does from the preference which is given to chemical and scientific institutions: mere chemists can even become famous "authorities") .

The blossom of science has a vital atmosphere of its own. It is made impossible neither by a declining culture (like the Alexandrian) nor by a non-culture (like our own). Knowing is probably even a substitute for culture.

89

Are periods of eclipse, as e.g. the middle ages, really periods of health, perhaps times of sleep for the intellectual genius of man?

Or are even these eclipses results of higher purposes? If books have their own fate, then the decline of a book is certainly also afatum with some purpose.

What perplexes us is the purpose.

90

In the philosopher, activities are carried out by means of metaphor. The striving for *uniform* control. Each thing gravitates towards a condition of immeasurability. In nature, the character of the individual is seldom something fixed; instead, it is always expanding. Whether this occurs *slowly* or *quickly* is a highly human question. Considered from the point of view of what is infinitely small, every development is always *infinitely quick*.

91

What does the truth matter to man? The highest and purest life is possible with the belief that one possesses truth. Man requires *belief in truth*.

Truth makes its appearance as a social necessity. Afterwards, by means of a metastasis, it is applied to everything, where it is not required.

All virtues arise from pressing needs. The necessity for truthfulness begins with society. Otherwise man dwells within eternal concealments. The establishment of states promotes truthfulness.

The drive toward knowledge has a *moral* origin.

92

Memory has nothing to do with the nerves and brain. It is itself an original property, for man carries around within himself the memory of all previous generations. A remembered *image* is something very artificial and *rare*.

One can just as little speak of an unerring memory as of an absolutely purposive action of natural law.

93

Is there such a thing as an unconscious inference? Does matter *infer*? It has feelings and it strives for its individual being. "Will" is first manifest in *change*, i.e. there is a kind of *free will* which modifies a thing's essence on the basis of pleasure and the flight from displeasure. Matter has a number of *Protean* qualities which are, according to the nature of the attack, accented, reinforced, and instituted for the whole. Qualities seem to be nothing but specifically modified activities of a *single* matter, activities which are encountered according to proportions of degree and number.

94

We are acquainted with but *one* reality—the reality of *thoughts*. In what way? What if thought were the essence of things? What if memory and sensation were the *matter* of things?

95

Thought provides us with the concept of a totally new form of *reality*: a reality constructed from sensations and memory.

A man in the world might actually be able to comprehend himself as a character *in a dream* which is itself being dreamt at the same time.

96

The impact, the influence of one atom upon another is likewise something which presupposes *sensation*. Something which is intrinsically alien can have no effect upon anything else.

What is difficult is not awakening sensation, but awakening consciousness in the world. Yet this is nevertheless explicable if everything is sensate.

If everything is sensate then there is a pell mell confusion of the smallest, the larger, and the largest centers of sensation. Whether larger or smaller, these sensation complexes would be called "will."

We free ourselves from *qualities* only with difficulty.

97

Sensation, reflex movements which occur very frequently and with the speed of lightning and which gradually become very familiar, produce the operation of inferring, i.e. the sense of causality. Space and time depend upon the sensation of causality. Memory preserves the established reflex movements.

Consciousness begins with the sensation of causality, i.e. memory is older than consciousness. E.g. the mimosa tree has memory, but no consciousness. In the case of plants, this is naturally a memory without *images*.

But *memory* then must be part of the essence of *sensation;* thus it must be an original quality of things. But then reflex movement must also be an original quality of things.

The inviolability of the laws of nature surely means that sensation and memory are part of the essence of things. It is a matter of memory and sensation that when one substance comes into contact with another it decides in just *the way that it does*. At one time or another it *learned* to do so, i.e. the activities of the substance are *developed laws*. But then the decision must have been made by *pleasure* and *displeasure*.

98

However, if pleasure, displeasure, sensation, memory, and reflex movement are part of the essence of things, *then human knowledge penetrates far more deeply into the essence of things* [than otherwise].

The whole logic of nature then dissolves itself into a system of *pleasure* and *displeasure*. Everything snatches at pleasure and flees displeasure: that is the eternal law of nature.

99

All knowing is a process of measuring according to a criterion. Without a criterion, i.e. without any limitation, there is no knowing. It is the same in the realm of intellectual forms. For example, when I ask what might be the value of knowing as such, I have to adopt some higher position, or at least one that is *fixed*, so that it can serve as a criterion.

100

If we trace the entire intellectual world back to *stimulus* and *sensation*, this most paltry perception explains almost nothing.

The proposition, "there is no knowledge with a knower," or "no subject without an object and no object without a subject" is quite true, but it is extremely trivial.

101

We can say nothing about the thing in itself, for we have eliminated the standpoint of knowing, i.e. of measuring. A quality exists *for us*, i.e. it is measured by us. If we take away the measure, what remains of the quality?

What things are is something that can only be established by a measuring subject placed alongside them. The properties of things considered in themselves are no concern of ours; we are concerned with them only to the extent that they affect us.

Now the question is, how does such a measuring being originate? The plant too is a *measuring being*.

The overwhelming human consensus regarding things proves the complete homogeneity of men's perceptual apparati.

102

For the plant the world is thus and such; for us the world is thus and such. If we compare the two perceptual powers we consider our view of the world to be the more correct one, i.e. the one that corresponds more closely to the truth. Now man has evolved slowly, and knowledge is still evolving: his picture of the world thus becomes ever more true and complete. Naturally it is only a clearer and clearer *mirroring*. But the mirror itself is nothing entirely foreign and apart from the nature of things. On the contrary, it too slowly arose as [part of] the nature of things. We observe an effort to make the mirror more and more adequate. The natural process is carried on by science. Thus the things mirror themselves every more clearly, gradually liberating themselves from what is all too anthropomorphic. For the plant, the whole world is a plant; for us, it is human.

103

The progress of philosophy: It was first thought that men were the authors of all things. Gradually one explained things to himself by analogy with particular human qualities. Finally one arrived at *sensation*. Great question: is sensation an original fact about all matter? Attraction and repulsion?

104

The historical knowledge drive: Its goal is to understand human development and to eliminate everything miraculous from this development. This drive deprives the drive for culture of its greatest strength. This knowing is a mere luxuriating, for contemporary culture is raised no higher by means of it.

105

Philosophy is to be considered like astrology: namely, as an attempt to bind the fate of the world

to that of man, i.e. an attempt to regard the highest evolution of *man* as the highest evolution of the *world*. All the sciences receive their nourishment from this philosophical drive. Mankind abolishes first religions and then science.

106

Even the Kantian theory of knowledge was immediately employed by man for his own self-glorification: the world has its reality only in man. It is tossed back and forth like a ball in the heads of men. In truth however this theory means only this: Though one might think that there exists both a work of art and a stupid man to contemplate it, of course the work exists as a cerebral phenomenon for this stupid man only to the extent that he is himself an artist as well and contributes the forms [to the work]. He could boldly assert, "the work of art has no reality outside of my brain."

The *forms* of the intellect have very gradually arisen out of the matter. It is plausible in itself that these forms are strictly adequate to the truth. For where is an apparatus which could invent something new supposed to have come from?

107

It seems to me that the most important faculty is that of perceiving *shape*, i.e. a faculty based upon mirroring. Space and time are only things which have been measured according to some rhythm.

108

You should not flee into some metaphysics, but should actively sacrifice yourself to the *culture which is developing*. For this reason I am strongly opposed to dreamy idealism.

109

All knowledge originates from separation, delimitation, and restriction; there is no absolute knowledge of a whole.

110

Are pleasure and displeasure universal feelings? I believe not.

But where does artistic power make its appearance? In the crystal certainly. The formation of *shape*. Yet mustn't a perceiver be presupposed here?

111

Music as a *supplement* to *language*: many stimuli and entire states of stimulation which cannot be expressed in language can be rendered in music.

112

There is no *form* in nature, because there is no inner and no outer. All art depends upon the *mirror* of the eyes.

113

Human *sensory knowledge* certainly aims at beauty: it glorifies the world. Why should we

snatch at anything else? Why do we seek to transcend our senses? Restless knowledge leads to bleakness and ugliness. Let us *be content* with the aesthetic view of the world!

114

As soon as one wishes to *know* the thing in itself, *it is precisely this world* [which one comes to know]. Knowing is only possible as a process of mirroring and measuring oneself against *one* standard (sensation).

We *know* what the world is: absolute and unconditional knowledge is the desire to know without knowledge.

115

The so-called *unconscious inferences* can be traced back to the *all-preserving memory*, which presents us with experiences of a parallel sort and thus is *acquainted* in advance with the consequences of an action. It is not an anticipation of the effects; it is rather the feeling "similar causes, similar effects," which is generated by a remembered image.

116

Unconscious *inferences* set me to thinking: it is no doubt a process of passing from *image* to *image*. The image which is last attained then operates as a stimulus and motive. Unconscious thinking must take place apart from concepts: it must therefore occur in *perceptions*.

But this is the way in which contemplative philosophers and artists infer. They do the same thing that everyone does regarding their personal psychological impulses, but transferred into an impersonal world.

This kind of picture thinking is from the start not strictly logical, but still it is more or less logical. The philosopher then tries to replace this picture thinking with conceptual thinking. Instincts likewise appear to be a variety of picture thinking, which finally becomes a stimulus and motive.

117

We far too readily confuse *Kant's* "thing in itself" with the *Buddhists'* "true essence of things." On the one hand actuality exhibits nothing but *illusion*; on the other, it exhibits an *appearance which is totally adequate to the truth*. Illusion as non-being is confused with the appearance of beings. All possible superstitions find a place in this vacuum.

118

The philosopher caught in the nets of *language*.

119

I wish to depict and to empathize with the *prodigious development* of the one philosopher who desires knowledge, the philosopher of mankind.

Most people are so entirely under the control of their drives that they hardly notice what happens. I want to tell what happens and to call attention to it.

The *one* philosopher is here identical with all scientific endeavor; for all the sciences rest upon the philosopher's general foundation. The prodigious *unity* of all the knowledge drives must be demonstrated: the fragmented scholar.

120

Infinity is the primary fact. All that has to be explained now is where the *finite* comes from. But the point of view of the finite is purely sensuous, i.e. deceptive.

How can anyone dare to speak of the earth's destination?

There are no goals in infinite time and space: *what is there is always there*, in whatever form. There is no way to figure out what kind of metaphysical world there is supposed to be.

Mankind must be able to stand on its own without leaning on anything: the enormous task of the artists.

121

Time in itself is nonsense; it exists only for a being capable of sensation. It is the same with space.

All *shape* appertains to the subject. It is the grasping of *surfaces* by means of mirrors. We must subtract all qualities.

We are not able to think things as they are, because we are not permitted to think them [at all].

Everything remains as it is; i.e. all qualities give evidence of an undefinable and absolute state of affairs.

122

The terrible consequence of Darwinism (which, by the way, I consider to be true): all of our admiration is related to qualities which we consider to be eternal—moral qualities, artistic qualities, religious qualities, etc.

One does not advance a single step toward explaining purposiveness when one attempts to do so in terms of instincts. For even these instincts are only products of processes which have been going on for an endlessly long time.

The will does not objectify itself *adequately*, as Schopenhauer said it did. This becomes apparent when one begins with the most perfect forms.

Even this will is a highly complicated end product of nature. It presupposes *nerves*.

And even the force of gravity is no simple phenomenon, but is, in turn, an effect of the movement of a solar system, of the aether, etc.

And mechanical impact is also something complex.

The universal aether as the primal matter.

123

All knowing is a mirroring in quite specific forms which did not exist from the beginning. Nature is acquainted with neither *shape* nor *size*; only to the knower do things appear to be large or small. Nature's *infinity*: it has no boundaries anywhere. Only for us is anything finite. Time is *infinitely* divisible.

124

The objective value of knowledge: it does not improve anything. It has
no final, universal goals. It originates accidentally. The value of truth
fulness: it, on the other hand, improves things! Its goal is decline. It
sacrifices. Our art is the reflection of desperate knowledge.

125

In knowledge mankind possesses a beautiful means of decline.

126

That man has developed in the way that he has and not in some other way is after all certainly his own accomplishment: it is his *nature* to be so immersed in illusion (dream) and dependent upon the surface (eye). Is it surprising that, in the end, his truth drives return to his fundamental nature?

127

We feel ourselves to be great when we hear of a man who would not lie even when his life depended upon it—even more so when a statesman out of truthfulness demolishes an empire.

128

By means of a free transference in the realm of duty, our habits become virtues, i.e. because we include inviolability within the concept [of our habits]. In other words, our habits become virtues because we consider their inviolability to be more important than our own particular welfare. Accordingly this occurs through a sacrifice of the individual, or at least the hovering possibility of such a sacrifice. The realm of the virtues and the arts—our metaphysical world—begins at that point where the individual starts to regard himself as unimportant. If there were *nothing* in the nature of things which *corresponded to what is moral*, then *duty* would be especially *pure*.

129

I do not inquire concerning the purpose of knowing: it originated accidentally, i.e. without any rationally intended purpose—as an extension or a solidification of a way of thinking and acting which was necessary in certain cases.

130

Man does not by nature exist in order to know: *truthfulness* (and *metaphor*) have produced the inclination for truth. Thus the intellectual drive is produced by an aesthetically generalized moral phenomenon.

131

Like recalls like and compares itself to it. That is what knowing consists in: the rapid classification of things that are similar to each other. Only like perceives like: a physiological process. The perception of something new is also the same as memory. It is not thought piled upon thought.

132

The world's value must be revealed by even its smallest fraction. Look at man and then you will know what opinion you must have of the world.

133

In some cases necessity produces truthfulness as a society's means of existence.

Through frequent practice this drive is reinforced and is now unjustifiably transmitted by means of metastasis. It becomes an inclination in itself. A quality [viz. truth] develops out of a practice [designed] for specific cases. Now we have the drive for knowledge.

This generalization takes place by means of an intervening *concept*. This quality commences with a *false* judgment: "to be true means to be true *always*." From this arises the inclination not to live in lies: elimination of all illusions.

But one is chased out of one net and into another.

134

The good man now wants to be the true man as well and believes in the truth of all things—not only things of society but also of the world. Consequently, he also believes in the possibility of getting to the bottom of things. For why should the world deceive him?

Thus he transfers his own inclination to the world and believes that the world *must* also be true to him.

135

I consider it false to speak of an unconscious goal of mankind. Unlike an anthill, mankind is not a whole. One can perhaps speak of the unconscious goal of a city or a people, but what does it mean to speak of the unconscious goal of *all the anthills* on earth?

136

Mankind propagates itself through impossibilities; these are its *virtues*. The categorical imperative, as well as the demand "children, love one another," are examples of such impossible demands.

Similarly, *pure logic* is the impossibility which supports science.

The philosopher is the rarest of the great, because knowledge came to man only incidentally and not as an original endowment. But for this reason the philosopher is also the highest type of great man.

137

In pursuing the goal of knowledge, our natural science is heading for *decline*.

Our historical education is heading for the death of all culture. It enters into battle against religions and incidentally destroys cultures.

This is an unnatural reaction against frightful religious pressure—now taking refuge in extremes. Lacking all measure.

138

A *negative* morality is the kind with the most grandeur, because it is wonderfully impossible. What does it signify if man says "No!" with full consciousness, while all his senses and nerves say "Yes!" and his every fiber and cell oppose his negation?

When I speak of the frightful possibility that knowledge promotes decline, the last thing I intend to do is to pay a compliment to the present generation: for it contains nothing of such tendencies. But

when one observes the progress of science since the fifteenth century, then, to be sure, such a power and such a possibility are revealed.

139

The combination of a felt stimulus and a glance at a movement produces causality, first of all as an empirical principle. Two things, a particular sensation and a particular visual image, always appear together. That the one is the cause of the other is a *metaphor borrowed from will and act*: an analogical inference.

The only causal relation of which we are conscious is the one between willing and acting. We transfer this onto all things and explain to ourselves the relationship between two alterations which are always found together. The intention or willing yields the *nomina*; the acting, the *verba*.

The animal as willing—that is its essence.

From *quality and act*: One of our properties leads us to act, whereas it is in reality the case that we infer from actions to properties. Since we see actions of a particular kind we assume the existence of properties.

Thus, the *action* comes first; we connect it with a property.

The word for the action originates first; the word for the quality is derived from it. When transferred to all things this relationship [between action and property] is *causality*.

"Seeing" comes first, and then "vision." "The one who sees" is taken to be the cause of "seeing." Between the sense and its function we feel that there is a regular relationship. Causality is the transfer of this relationship (of sense to sensory function) to all things.

It is a primal phenomenon to refer the stimulus which is felt in the eye to the eye itself, i.e. to refer a sensory excitation to the sense. In itself all that is given is a stimulus; it is a causal inference to feel this stimulus as an activity of the eye and to call it "seeing." The first causal sensation occurs when *a stimulus is felt as an activity*, when something passive is sensed as something active. I.e. the first sensation already generates the causal sensation. The inner connection of stimulus and activity is transferred to all things. *The eye acts upon a stimulus*, i.e. it sees. We explain the world to ourselves in terms of our sensory functions, i.e. we presuppose causality everywhere, because we ourselves *continually experience* alterations of this sort.

140

Time, space, and causality are only *metaphors* of knowledge, with which we explain things to ourselves. Stimulus and activity are connected: how this is we do not know; we understand not a single causality, but we have immediate experience of them. Every affliction elicits an act; every act, an affliction. This most universal of all feelings is already a *metaphor*. The perceived manifold already presupposes space and time, succession and coexistence. Temporal coexistence produces the sensation of space.

The sensation of time is given along with the feeling of cause and effect, as an answer to the question concerning the speed of various causalities.

The sensation of space can only be metaphorically derived from the sensation of time, or is it vice versa?

Two causalities located side by side.

141

The only way to subdue the manifold is by constructing classes, e.g. by calling a large number of ways of acting "bold." We explain them to ourselves when we bring them under the category "bold."

All explaining and knowing is actually nothing but categorizing. With a bold leap, the multiplicity of things is now brought under a single heading when we treat them as though they were so many countless actions of a *single* quality, e.g. as actions of water, according to Thales. Here we have a transference: an abstraction holds together innumerable actions and is taken to be their cause. What is the abstraction (property) that holds together the multiplicity of all things? The quality "watery," "moist." The whole world is moist; *therefore, being moist is the whole world*. Metonymy, A false inference. A predicate is confused with a sum of predicates (definition).

142

Logical thinking was employed very little by the Ionians and developed quite slowly. But, false inferences are more correctly understood as metonymies, i.e. they are more correctly understood rhetorically and poetically.

All *rhetorical figures* (i.e. the essence of language) are *logically invalid inferences*. This is the way that reason begins.

143

We see how philosophy is at first carried on in the same manner that *language originated*—i.e. illogically.

Now the pathos of *truth* and *truthfulness* is added. To begin with this has nothing to do with matters of logic, but signifies merely that *no conscious deception* is committed. But these deceptions contained in language and philosophy are unconscious at first, and it is very difficult to become conscious of them. But a peculiar struggle ensued from the coexistence of difference philosophies (or religious systems), each of which was propounded with the same pathos. The coexistence of mutually hostile religions caused each to promote itself by declaring the others to be untrue. The case was the same with [coexistent philosophical] systems.

This led some persons to skepticism. "Truth is very deep," they sighed.

With Socrates, truthfulness gains possession of logic. It notices the infinite difficulty of correct classification.

144

Our sense perceptions are based, not upon unconscious inferences, but upon tropes. The primal procedure is to seek out some likeness between one thing and another, to identify like with like. *Memory* lives by means of this activity and practices it continually. *Confusion* [of one thing with another] is the primal phenomenon. This presupposes the *perception of shapes*. The image in the eye sets the standard for our knowing, as rhythm does for our hearing. Using only the eye, we should *never* have arrived at the notion of time; using only the ear, we should never have arrived at the notion of space. The sensation of causality corresponds to the sense of touch.

From the very beginning, we see the visual images only *within ourselves*; we hear the sound only *within ourselves*. It is a big step from this to the postulation of an external world. Plants, for example, sense no external world. The senses of touch and vision provide [us with] two coexisting sensations, and, since they always appear together, they arouse the idea of a connection (by means of a *metaphor*—for all things which appear together are not connected).

An abstraction is a most important product. It is an enduring impression which is retained and solidified in the memory. It is compatible with very many appearances and is for this reason very rough and inadequate to each particular appearance.

145

Man's falsity toward himself and toward others: Ignorance presupposed as necessary for existence (alone—and in society). The deception of ideas appears in the *vacuum*. The dream. The traditional concepts (which, despite nature, dominate the old German painters) are different in every age. Metonymies. Stimuli, not complete knowledge. The eye provides shapes. We cling to the surface. The taste for what is beautiful. Logical deficiency, but metaphors. Religions, philosophies. *Imitation*.

146

Imitation is a means employed by all culture. By this means instinct is gradually produced. *All comparison (primal thinking) is imitation*. Thus arise *types*, which strictly imitate the first, merely similar, specimens, i.e. what are copied are the greatest and most powerful specimens. Inculcation of a *second nature* by means of imitation. Unconscious copying is most remarkable in procreation, by the means of which a second nature is reared.

147

Our senses imitate nature by copying it more and more.

Imitation presupposes first the reception of an image and then a continuous translation of the received image into a thousand metaphors, all of which are efficacious. Analog.

148

What power forces us to engage in imitation? The appropriation of an unfamiliar impression by means of metaphors. Stimulus and recollected image bound together by means of metaphor (analogical inference). Result: similarities are discovered and reanimated. A stimulus which has been *repeated* occurs once again in a recollected image.

Stimulus perceived; now *repeated* in many metaphors, in the course of which related images from a variety of categories flock together. Every perception produces a manifold imitation of the stimulus, but transferred into different territories.

A stimulus is felt; transmitted to related nerves; and there, in translation, repeated, etc.

A translation of one sense impression into another occurs: many people see or taste something when they hear a particular sound. This is quite a general phenomenon.

149

Imitation is the opposite of *knowing*, to the extent that knowing certainly does not want to admit any transference, but wishes instead to cling to the impression without metaphor and apart from the consequences. The impression is petrified for this purpose; it is captured and stamped by means of concepts. Then it is killed, skinned, mummified, and preserved as a concept.

But there is no "real" expression and *no real knowing apart from metaphor*. But deception on this point remains, i.e. the *belief* in a *truth* of sense impressions. The most accustomed metaphors, the usual ones, now pass for truths and as standards for measuring the rarer ones. The only intrinsic difference here is the difference between custom and novelty, frequency and rarity.

Knowing is nothing but working with the favorite metaphors, an imitating which is no longer felt to be an imitation. Naturally therefore, it cannot penetrate the realm of truth.

The pathos of the truth drive presupposes the observation that the various metaphorical worlds are at variance and struggle with one another. E.g. the world of dreams, lies, etc. and the ordinary usual

view of things: the first type of metaphorical world is rarer; the other is more frequent. Thus the rule struggles against the exception, the regular against the unaccustomed: hence the higher esteem for everyday reality than for the dream world.

Now however, what is rare and unaccustomed is *more attractive*; the lie is felt as a stimulus. Poetry.

150

All laws of nature are only relations between x, y, and z. We define laws of nature as relations to an x, y, and z—each of which we are in turn acquainted with only in relation to other x, y, and z's.

Knowledge, strictly speaking, has only the form of tautology and *is empty*. All the knowledge which is of assistance to us involves the *identification of things which are not the same*, of things which are only similar. In other words, such knowledge is essentially illogical.

Only in this way do we obtain a concept. Then afterwards we behave as if the concept, e.g. the concept "man," were something factual, whereas it is surely only something which we have constructed through a process of ignoring all individual features. We presuppose that nature behaves in accordance with such a concept. But in this case first nature and then the concept are anthropomorphic. The *omitting* of what is individual provides us with the concept, and with this our knowledge begins: in *categorizing*, in the establishment of *classes*. But the essence of things does not correspond to this: it is a process of knowledge which does not touch upon the essence of things. A thing is determined for us by many individual features, but not by all of them. The sameness of these features induces us to gather many things under a single concept.

We produce beings as the *bearers of properties* and abstractions as the causes of these properties. That a unity, e.g. a tree, appears to us to be a multiplicity of properties and relations is something doubly anthropomorphic: in the first place, this delimited unity, "tree," does not exist; it is arbitrary to carve out a thing in this manner (according to the eye, according to the form). Furthermore, each relation is not the true, absolute relation, but is again anthropomorphically colored.

151

What the philosopher is seeking is not truth, but rather the metamorphosis of the world into men. He strives for an understanding of the world with self-consciousness. He strives for an assimilation. He is satisfied when he has explained something anthropomorphically. Just as the astrologer regards the world as serving the single individual, the philosopher regards the world as a human being.

152

The nature of definition: the pencil is an elongated, etc. body. A is B. In this case, that which is elongated is also colored. Properties only support relations. A particular body is the equivalent of so many relations. Relations can never be the essence [of the thing], but only consequences of this essence. A synthetic judgment describes a thing according to its consequences, i.e. *essence* and *consequences* become *identified*, i.e. a *metonymy*.

Thus a *metonymy* lies at the essence of synthetic judgment; that is to say that it is a *false equation*. In other words, *synthetic inferences are illogical*. When we employ them we are presupposing the popular metaphysics, i.e. that metaphysics which regards effects as causes.

The concept "pencil" is confused with the "thing" pencil. The "is" in a synthetic judgment is false; it includes a transference. Two different spheres, between which there can never be an equation, are placed next to each other.

We live and think amid nothing but effects of what is *illogical*—in ignorance and false knowledge.

153

Individuals are the bridges upon which becoming depends. All qualities are originally only *solitary activities*, which are then frequently repeated in similar situations and finally become habits. The entire being of an individual takes part in every activity, and a specific modification of the individual corresponds to a habit. Everything in an individual, right down to the smallest cells, is individual—which means that it has a part in all the individual's experiences and past. Hence the possibility of *procreation*.

154

Certain sets of concepts can become so vehement through isolation that they draw into themselves the strength of other drives. The knowledge drive is an example of this.

A nature which has been thus prepared, determined right down to the cell, now propagates itself in turn and becomes heredity, intensifying until its general energy is finally destroyed by its one-sided absorption.

155

The artist does not gaze upon "ideas": he feels pleasure in numerical ratios.

All pleasure [depends upon] proportion; displeasure upon disproportion.

Concepts constructed according to numbers.

Perceptions which exhibit good numerical ratios are beautiful.

The man of science *calculates* the numbers of the laws of nature; the artist *gazes* at them. In the one case, conformity to law; in the other, beauty.

What the artist gazes upon is something entirely superficial; it is no "idea"! The most delicate shell surrounding beautiful numbers.

156

The relation between the work of art and nature is similar to the relation between the mathematical circle and the natural circle.

[Notes for the Preface]

157

Dedicated to the immortal Arthur Schopenhauer. Preface to Schopenhauer: Entrance to the underworld. I have sacrificed many a black sheep to you—about which the other sheep complain.

158

In this book I do not take present-day scholars into account and thus appear to be indifferent toward them. But if one desires to reflect peacefully on serious matters, he must not be disturbed by disgusting sights. I now turn to them with reluctance in order to tell them that I am not indifferent toward them, though I wish that I were.

159

I am trying to be useful to those who are worthy of being seriously and opportunely introduced to philosophy. This attempt may or may not succeed. I am only too well aware that it can be surpassed and I wish nothing more than that I might be imitated and surpassed to the benefit of this philosophy.

Persons such as those mentioned above are advised—with good reason—to read Plato rather than to trust themselves to the guidance of the popular academic professional philosophers.

Above all, they should unlearn all sorts of stupidities and become simple and natural.

The danger of falling into the wrong hands.

160

The philologists of the present age have proven themselves unworthy of being permitted to consider me and my book as one of their own. It is hardly necessary to affirm that, in this case as well, I leave it up to them whether they want to learn anything or not. But I still do not feel in the least inclined to meet them half way.

May that which now calls itself "philology" (and which I designate only neutrally on purpose) ignore my book this time as well. For this book has a manly temperament and is of no value for castrati. It is much more seemly for them to be seated at the loom of conjecture.

161

I have not made things easy for those who merely wish to get a *scholarly* satisfaction from it, for ultimately, I have not considered them at all. There are no quotations.

162

The age of the seven wise men was not very concerned about the attribution of wise sayings, but considered it very important when someone adopted a saying.

163

Write in a completely impersonal and cold manner.

Omit all "us," "we," and "I." Also limit the number of sentences with "that." So far as possible, avoid all technical terms.

Everything must be said as specifically as possible, and every technical term, including "will" must be left out.

164

I would like to treat the question of the value of knowledge as it would be treated by a cold angel who sees through the whole shabby farce. Without anger, but without warmth.

Appendix:

Some Additional Passages from Notebook P I 20

1

Illusion is a necessity of life for a sensate being.

Illusion is necessary for the advance of culture.

What does the insatiable knowledge drive desire?
In any case, it is hostile to culture.
Philosophy seeks to master this drive; it is an instrument of culture.

The early philosophers.

2

All natural science is nothing but an attempt to understand man and what is anthropological; more correctly, it is an attempt to return continuously to man via the longest and most roundabout ways. Man's inflation to a macrocosm, in order to be able to say in the end: "in the end you are what you are."

3

In its own way, philosophical thinking is as valid as scientific thinking, but the former appeals to *great* things and concerns. Greatness, however, is a changeable concept, partly aesthetic and partly moral. Philosophical thinking is a mastery of the knowledge drive. This is its significance for culture.

4

Culture is a unity. The philosopher only seems to stand outside of it. He addresses the most distant posterity—fame. It is remarkable that the Greeks philosophized.

The beautiful lie. But it is even more remarkable that *man* in general came upon the pathos of truth. The images within him are certainly much mightier than the nature around him—as in the case of those 18th century painters, who, despite the encompassing nature, depicted limbs in the spidery fashion dictated by the old pious tradition.

Plato desires a state governed by *dialectic*; he denies the culture of the beautiful lie.

5

The pathos of truth in a world of lies.
The world of lies [encountered] again in the highest peaks of philosophy.

The goal of these highest lies is mastery of the unlimited knowledge drive.
How is it that there is any pathos of truth in this world of lies?
From morality. The pathos of truth and logic.
Culture and the truth.

Every small bit of knowledge contains within itself a great satisfaction, though not as truth, but rather as the belief that one has discovered truth. What kind of satisfaction is this?

6

The instincts of morality: maternal love—gradually turning into love in general. Sexual love likewise. I recognize *transferences* everywhere.

7

The man who does not believe in the truthfulness of nature, but instead sees metamorphoses, disguises, and masquerades everywhere—the man who catches a glimpse of gods in stones, [illegible] in horses, and nymphs in trees: now when such a man sets up truthfulness as a law for himself, he also believes in the truthfulness of nature toward him.

8

Nature has cushioned man in sheer illusions: that is man's proper element. He sees forms and feels stimuli rather than truths. He dreams and imagines godlike men as nature.

Man has accidentally become a *knowing being* through the unintentional pairing of two qualities. At some time or other he will cease to exist and nothing will have happened.

9

Likewise the basic thought of science is that man is the measure of all things. Ultimately, every law of nature is a sum of anthropomorphic relations. Especially number: the breaking up of all laws into multiplicities, their expression in numerical formulas, is a μεταφορά, in the same way that someone who is unable to hear judges music and sound by Chladni's sound figures.

10

One shows confidence in a *truth* he has found by wishing to communicate it. One can then communicate it in two ways: in its effects, so that others are convinced by a backwards inference of the value of the foundation; or by demonstrating [its] generation from and logical interconnection with truths which are all certain and previously recognized. The interconnection consists in the correct subordination of special cases under general principles—it is pure categorization.

11

Abstractions are metonymies, i.e. substitutions of cause and effect. But every concept is a metonymy, and knowing takes place in concepts. "Truth" turns into a *power* when we have first isolated it as an abstraction.

12

But the impulse to be true, transferred onto *nature*, gives rise to the belief that nature must be true toward us. The knowledge drive depends upon this transference.